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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Private or Public Insurance? The Institutional History of Health 
 
Care in the United States and the United Kingdom 
 
 
by 
 
 
Karin M. Abel, Master of Science 
 
Utah State University, 2010 
 
 
Major Professor: Dr. Christy Glass 
Program: Sociology 
 
 
 The primary question at issue in this paper is the following: given the similarities 
between the two countries with regard to welfare state institutions, why have the United 
States and the United Kingdom diverged on the issue of health care? Drawing on 
sociological institutionalism, a branch of the new institutionalist paradigm, this paper 
provides an answer to this question: during the formative years of the health care stories 
in the two countries, variations in institutional and cultural conditions produced 
contrasting policy outcomes. More specifically, this paper discusses how the combination 
of institutions (political, labor, and medical) and culture led to private insurance in the 
United States and public insurance in the United Kingdom. Of course, this paper has 
implications for several areas of scholarship, as well as for current policy debates on a 
wide range of issues. 
 (72 pages) 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Although they have much in common when it comes to the role of the state in 
society, the United States and the United Kingdom have vastly different health care 
systems. General government expenditure on health care as a percent of total expenditure 
on health care is much less in the United States than in the United Kingdom (World 
Health Organization 2009). In other words, the private sector plays a significant part in 
the administration of health care in the United States, whereas health care is primarily a 
public responsibility in the United Kingdom. Generally speaking, in the United States, 
the individual must acquire health insurance on his/her own, either through employment 
or some other means. Alternatively, in the United Kingdom, the government uses tax 
revenues to fund most health care (Raffel 1997). Given the similarities between these two 
countries with regard to welfare state institutions, why have they diverged on the issue of 
health care? 
 Gaining a better understanding of the origin/evolution of health care systems is 
important for at least two reasons: (1) history shapes contemporary realities, and (2) 
history provides a context for efforts to enact social change. With regard to the first 
reason, evidence suggests that the current health care systems in the United States and the 
United Kingdom vary in several ways, including access and outcomes. Problems related 
to access exist in both countries, but the sources of these problems are not the same. A 
central concern in the United States is financial access. Patients are at particularly high 
risk of foregoing care due to cost (Blendon et al. 2002; Donelan et al. 1999; Schoen and 
Doty 2004; Schoen et al. 2005; 2007; 2009). In the United Kingdom, on the other hand, 
individuals with below- and above-average incomes have comparable access to health 
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care services (Schoen and Doty 2004). While barriers that stem from cost are virtually 
nonexistent in the United Kingdom, lack of access as a result of waiting times is a 
problem. In distinction, waiting times in the United States are often shorter than in the 
United Kingdom (Adeniran 2004; Blendon et al. 2002; Carroll et al. 1995; Donelan et al. 
1999). 
 With respect to health outcomes, the United Kingdom fares slightly better than 
the United States on infant mortality rate and life expectancy at birth, two good indicators 
of overall population health (World Health Organization 2009). However, these 
differences are not necessarily the result of variation in health care systems. Other factors 
(e.g., lifestyle choices) may be to blame. A more meaningful approach might be to 
examine the ways in which inequality within each health care system affects health 
outcomes. In the United States, tens of millions of people have no health insurance 
(DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, and Smith 2009). Additionally, uninsured individuals are at 
greater risk for negative health outcomes than those with insurance (Franks, Clancy, and 
Gold 1993). In contrast, in the United Kingdom, universal coverage ensures that all have 
access to at least some form of health insurance. Interestingly, individuals who obtain 
supplemental private insurance do not gain an advantage on access or quality of care 
measures over those who have only public insurance (Schoen and Doty 2004). It seems 
likely, then, that differences in health outcomes in the United Kingdom may not be as 
strongly linked to the health care system as is the case in the United States. Clearly, the 
US and UK health care systems vary in terms of access and outcomes. 
 As for the second reason, understanding the origin/evolution of health care 
systems is vital to determining avenues for future social change. Analysis of past efforts 
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to shape health care systems offers a baseline from which to evaluate the prospects of 
present proposals for reform. This point is especially applicable now since the United 
States is in the midst of a debate about health care reform. (Although President Barack 
Obama’s health care proposal recently became law, several states are in the process of 
challenging the constitutionality of the legislation [Richey 2010].) Through an increased 
understanding of how health care systems form, important stakeholders may be better 
able to identify the range of institutional possibilities. 
As extant literature on health care systems largely focuses on the operation and/or 
effectiveness of established programs, this paper makes a meaningful contribution to 
health studies in that it deals with the origin/evolution of health care systems. The 
sections that follow provide a historical-comparative analysis of the US and UK health 
care systems. After establishing that the United States and the United Kingdom have 
much in common when it comes to welfare state institutions, this paper draws on the new 
institutionalist paradigm to help explain why the US and UK health care systems are on 
different trajectories. 
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THEORY 
 
 
 In his book entitled The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism, Esping-Andersen 
(1990) introduces a threefold typology of social democratic, conservative, and liberal 
welfare regimes. “‘Regimes’ refers to the ways in which welfare production is allocated 
between state, market, and households” (Esping-Andersen 1999:73). The key defining 
dimensions of this “three worlds” typology are degree of decommodification and modes 
of stratification. Decommodification occurs when services are considered a matter of 
right, and individuals can maintain a socially acceptable standard of living independently 
of market participation. With regard to stratification, the welfare state is not just a 
mechanism that limits inequality; rather, the welfare state is a system of stratification in 
its own right in that it may stigmatize recipients of services (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Level of decommodification and modes of stratification vary across the three 
welfare regimes, contributing to different arrangements between state, market, and 
family. High decommodification, strong universalism, and marginalization of private 
welfare characterize the social democratic welfare regime. The conservative welfare 
regime is modestly decommodifying and corporatist. Benefits are associated with 
occupational status. This type of regime also emphasizes familialism. Parents (or 
children) must be responsible for their children (or parents) if needs arise. The state 
intervenes only when the family’s capacity to take care of its members is exhausted. The 
liberal welfare regime limits decommodification-effects, stressing the minimization of the 
role of the state, individualization of risks, and promotion of market solutions. This 
regime type views citizens’ entitlements with disfavor. Only when the market fails does 
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the state act (Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999). Table 1 summarizes Esping-Andersen’s 
“three worlds” typology. 
 
Regime Type
Degree of 
Decommodification Stratification Effects
State-Market-Family 
Relations
Social Democratic High decommodification; 
universal entitlements
Low poverty/inequality; 
marginalization of 
private welfare
Full employment policies 
are key distributive 
mechanism
Conservative Moderate 
decommodification; 
entitlements associated 
with occupational status 
(corporatism)
Ordered inequality; 
traditional status 
relations
State intervenes only 
when family's capacity to 
take care of its members 
exhausted (familialism)
Liberal Low decommodification; 
entitlements based on 
demonstrable and abject 
need
High poverty/inequality; 
stigma attached to 
social assistance
State intervenes only 
when market fails
Table 1. Esping-Andersen's "Three Worlds" Typology
 
 
 According to Esping-Andersen (1990; 1999), both the United States and the 
United Kingdom are liberal welfare regimes. Moreover, there is broad consensus that the 
two countries fall under the same general category on the issue of welfare state provision 
(Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 1990; 1999; Powell and Barrientos 2004). The 
fact that the United States and the United Kingdom are often grouped together in the 
welfare state literature suggests that the two countries have reached comparable policy 
outcomes on multiple occasions. For example, relative to many other countries, both the 
United States and the United Kingdom are extraordinarily biased toward targeted social 
assistance programs (i.e., needs-based [as opposed to rights-based] assistance programs). 
The two countries also favor a private welfare approach when it comes to the matter of 
pensions. In terms of family welfare provision, both the United States and the United 
Kingdom offer little public support as it relates to care for the elderly (Esping-Andersen 
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1999). Given the similarities between the two countries with regard to welfare state 
institutions, why have the United States and the United Kingdom taken such different 
paths on the issue of health care? Attempting to answer this question through the lens of 
new institutionalism may offer some valuable insight. 
 The new institutionalist paradigm provides the theoretical underpinnings for a 
large body of work in sociology (e.g., Brinton and Nee 1998). A response to the political 
behavior movement of the 1950s and 1960s, new institutionalism strongly rejects 
“observed behavior as the basic datum of political analysis” (Immergut 1998:6). Instead, 
the new institutionalist paradigm argues that behavior occurs in the context of 
institutions; therefore, institutions should be the primary focus of attention (Immergut 
1998). Although it presumes purposive action on the part of individuals, new 
institutionalism takes into account the concept of context-bound rationality. The new 
institutionalist paradigm, then, involves integrating the choice-theoretic tradition with 
comparative institutional analysis (Nee 1998). 
Hall and Taylor (1996) identify three varieties of new institutionalism: historical 
institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism. All 
three schools of thought are concerned with the role that institutions play in the 
determination of social and political outcomes. While they overlap in some respects, the 
three new institutionalist approaches also have their differences. Historical 
institutionalism is especially attentive to the ways in which the unequal distribution of 
power affects outcomes. Another component of historical institutionalism is the concept 
of path dependency. Mahoney (2000:507) states that “path dependence characterizes 
specifically those historical sequences in which contingent events set into motion 
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institutional patterns or event chains that have deterministic properties.” In other words, 
early choices and events shape the subsequent development of institutions and policies. 
Historical institutionalism also focuses on the relationship between institutions and 
beliefs (Hall and Taylor 1996). 
Rational choice institutionalism borrows from exchange theory. This school of 
thought assumes that individuals aim to maximize the attainment of their own 
preferences. Under this model, the role of institutions is to reduce the uncertainty present 
during interactions. In the process of competitive selection, the institutions that provide 
the most benefits to relevant individuals are the ones that tend to persist (Hall and Taylor 
1996). 
Sociological institutionalism seeks to break down “the conceptual divide between 
‘institutions’ and ‘culture’” (Hall and Taylor 1996:947). Stated another way, culture 
influences the form institutions take, and institutions reinforce culture. Institutions are not 
as concerned with means-ends efficiency as they are with social legitimacy. As such, they 
generally adopt practices that are acceptable within the broader cultural environment. In 
short, culture determines the social legitimacy of institutional arrangements (Hall and 
Taylor 1996). 
While all three varieties of new institutionalism are relevant to the study of health 
care systems, this paper mainly draws on sociological institutionalism. With regard to the 
origin/evolution of health care systems, two questions are of central importance: (1) 
which institutions matter, and (2) what is the role of culture? 
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Institutions 
As to the first question, this paper discusses the impact of political, labor, and 
medical institutions on the formation of health care systems. Political institutions are of 
interest because they are the location of policymaking. The US system of checks and 
balances makes it hard to enact and implement policies. A two-party dynamic encourages 
members of both parties to avoid taking risks, so bold reforms are especially difficult to 
achieve. Even when dominated by the same party as the executive, Congress has 
considerable autonomy. Put another way, achieving unity on a given issue is challenging. 
To complicate circumstances, all kinds of interest groups have many opportunities 
throughout the lawmaking process to derail proposals. Politicians regularly introduce 
major proposals; however, these proposals rarely become law. State politics often follow 
a similar pattern (Sakala 1990). 
The situation in the United Kingdom is much different. In the UK parliamentary 
system, the party that wins the most seats in the House of Commons gains control of the 
government and chooses the prime minister. The UK executive and assembly can work 
together to implement policies consistent with the platform upon which the party was 
brought into office. The absence of a strictly two-party dynamic improves the prospects 
of bold reforms, and limitations on interest group participation increase the likelihood of 
legislative success (Sakala 1990). Surely, then, the structure of political institutions is a 
major contributor to change in health care systems over time. From this discussion on 
political institutions, a proposition emerges: political structures that have more 
autonomous institutional layers are less likely to implement universal health care. 
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 As for labor institutions, Esping-Andersen (1990:1) argues “that the history of 
political class coalitions is the most decisive cause of welfare-state variations.” The 
extent to which workers are able to, first, unite in purpose and, second, build broad-based 
coalitions has implications for welfare-state development (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Skocpol (1992) suggests that experiences in two different national political systems 
prompted the US and UK labor movements to take on distinct structural forms. For the 
last couple decades of the nineteenth century, the US labor movement was a viable 
political force. Mainstream political parties often sought labor votes. Moreover, in many 
parts of the country, independent labor and populist parties were thriving. As a result, 
American unions were able to achieve many legislative victories. Around the turn of the 
twentieth century, though, adverse electoral shifts led to less competitive elections. 
Consequently, the US labor movement’s political influence declined. In an effort to retain 
the greatest political leverage possible, unions all over the country developed mutually 
beneficial relationships with local entities, making any unified national campaign on 
labor’s behalf extremely unlikely. 
In addition, throughout this time period, the US labor movement was in a constant 
battle with the courts. Eventually, many labor leaders concluded that reform through 
legislation was a waste of time (Skocpol 1992). As Skocpol (1992:227) states, “Bitter 
experiences with the courts could sour labor leaders on the very idea of working for 
change through elections and legislatures.” Accordingly, the US labor movement turned 
to market unionism and collective bargaining (Skocpol 1992). 
In sharp contrast, the UK labor movement found political involvement rewarding. 
As they operated under a unitary and centralized system of government, all British unions 
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were subject to the same laws and judicial rulings. Therefore, the UK labor movement 
was able to unite around a common set of political objectives. During the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, to ensure their basic institutional security, British unions created the 
Trades Union Congress, campaigned for the election of labor-friendly parliamentary 
candidates, and established a national committee to lobby and monitor Parliament. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, they set up the Labour Representation Committee, 
precursor to the Labour Party (Skocpol 1992). 
Ultimately, the UK labor movement was able to secure meaningful representation 
in Parliament. British unions’ parliamentary allies reversed unfavorable judicial decisions 
and enacted social legislation consistent with labor’s interests. As a result of these 
developments, the UK labor movement determined that reform through legislation was an 
effective option. In other words, British unions believed that labor unity on the national 
level had the potential to produce favorable outcomes (Skocpol 1992). Labor movement 
structure, then, is likely a significant factor in the formation of health care systems over 
time. Another proposition emerges from this discussion on labor institutions: labor 
movements that are more fragmented are less likely to achieve universal health care. 
 As distributors of health services and key players in the development of health 
technology, medical institutions are a vital element of any discussion that deals with the 
origin/evolution of health care systems. Since they are at the center of many people’s 
interactions with health care systems, physicians are of particular importance. A crucial 
component of the patient-physician relationship is trust. One of the sources of this trust is 
professional authority. For much of the nineteenth century, US physicians struggled to 
attain professional authority; in the end, they were successful in this endeavor (Starr 
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1982). According to Starr (1982:18), “The forces that transformed medicine into an 
authoritative profession involved both its internal development and broader changes in 
social and economic life.” For instance, people began to view science as superior to other 
forms of knowledge, making physicians’ interpretations of experiences a valuable 
commodity. Similarly, advances in technology increased the plausibility of physicians’ 
claims to competent authority (Starr 1982). 
The institutionalization of standardized programs of licensing and education also 
had an impact (Starr 1982). As Moran (1999:42) states, “In a society with an egalitarian 
culture and a weak federal government, the problem of controlling and legitimising 
medical authority could only be tackled at the level of individual states, and by working 
to some low common denominator of medical competence.” This being the case, a 
licensing movement spread through individual states. State licensing boards became the 
key bodies in a greatly decentralized regulatory structure. To be eligible for licensing, 
individuals had to meet the requirements of a licensed medical school. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, American Medical Association (AMA) members controlled the state 
licensing boards. Shortly thereafter, the AMA emerged on the national scene as an 
authoritative voice on health matters (Moran 1999). 
Medicine’s fight for professional authority in the United Kingdom began during 
the sixteenth century. In 1518, London physicians secured the charter for the Royal 
College of Physicians. While it primarily benefited a small elite group, this charter was a 
step toward legitimacy for UK physicians on the whole (Moran 1999). “The critical event 
in creating the institutionally privileged position of medicine, however, was the passage 
of the 1858 Medical Act” (Moran 1999:29). The Act created a regulatory body known as 
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the General Council of Medical Education and Registration. The mark of a qualified 
physician was entry onto the Council’s register. In conjunction with the implementation 
of the Act, teaching hospitals, and later universities, assumed the responsibility of 
medical education. The end result was a centralized regulatory structure that reinforced 
the professional authority of UK physicians (Moran 1999). Once they have professional 
authority, physicians can likely influence social and political outcomes in the realm of 
health care. For this reason, physicians’ interests matter. The following proposition 
emerges from this discussion on medical institutions: medical organizations that have 
more power to pursue their own interests independent of the state are less likely to 
support universal health care. 
 
Culture 
With regard to the second question, sociological institutionalism contends that 
institutions and culture are intertwined. Existing culture shapes the form particular 
institutions take; these institutions then support the establishment of other institutions that 
are consistent with the culture (Hall and Taylor 1996). In terms of this paper, a country’s 
political, labor, and medical institutions evolve out of a broader cultural environment. 
Subsequently, they support the formation of health care institutions that are culturally 
reinforcing. The United States and the United Kingdom are dramatically different when it 
comes to culture. “Born out of revolution, the United States is a country organized around 
an ideology which includes a set of dogmas about the nature of a good society” (Lipset 
1996:31). The country’s founders took a deliberate turn away from the British model. In 
contrast to a centralized monarchical state, they created a weak and internally discordant 
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political system. In the United States, individual rights are of supreme importance; 
equality of opportunity and respect, not of result or condition, is paramount; and an 
empowered citizenry is fundamental. In short, an anti-statist culture is dominant (Lipset 
1996). 
In the United Kingdom, national identity is rooted in history not ideology. In 
other words, nationality is related to community, as opposed to an ideological 
commitment to a particular set of values. A country with a monarchical tradition, the 
United Kingdom demands a greater awareness of class divisions, as well as a stronger 
respect for the state, than does the United States. An anti-statist attitude is not ubiquitous 
(Lipset 1996). In all likelihood, culture plays a role in the origin/evolution of health care 
systems. The state is often the vehicle through which the implementation/administration 
of universal health care takes place. Strong anti-statist sentiment probably makes it 
difficult for the state to assume these responsibilities. Based on this discussion of culture, 
a final proposition emerges: cultural environments that project more anti-statist 
sentiment are less likely to facilitate universal health care. 
 To summarize, the United States and the United Kingdom are similar in terms of 
broader welfare state institutional approaches (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Esping-Andersen 
1990; 1999; Powell and Barrientos 2004). That said, the United States and the United 
Kingdom have vastly different health care systems. Sociological institutionalism, a 
branch of the new institutionalist paradigm, offers potential insight into why these two 
countries have diverged on the issue of health care. This theoretical framework suggests 
that institutions and culture matter when it comes to the origin/evolution of the US and 
UK health care systems. 
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METHODS 
 
 
Approach 
 This paper applies the historical-comparative approach to the study of health care 
systems. This approach is appropriate for comparing entire social systems, as well as for 
examining the combinations of social factors that contribute to specific outcomes. 
Historical-comparative research seeks to identify what is common across societies and 
what is unique. This type of research also aims to study long-term societal change 
(Neuman 2006). Given that the goal of this paper is to explain why the United States and 
the United Kingdom are on different health care paths, the historical-comparative 
approach is ideal. 
 
Data Collection Procedures 
 In this paper, nations are the units of analysis; the two nations of interest are the 
United States and the United Kingdom. As they identify significant historical and 
institutional factors that are important to the formation of health care systems, historical 
accounts and scholarly journals are the main data sources of this paper. 
 
Propositions and Variables 
 This paper’s variables come from four propositions. (See the “Theory” section.) 
Table 2 lists these propositions, as well as the corresponding variables. Below Table 2 is 
a brief description of each variable. 
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Proposition Variables
Political structures that have more autonomous institutional layers are 
less likely to implement universal health care.
Autonomous institutional 
layer; universal health care
Labor movements that are more fragmented are less likely to achieve 
universal health care.
Labor movement 
fragmentation; universal 
health care
Medical organizations that have more power to pursue their own 
interests independent of the state are less likely to support universal 
health care.
Medical power; universal 
health care
Cultural environments that project more anti-statist sentiment are less 
likely to facilitate universal health care.
Anti-statist sentiment; 
universal health care
Table 2. Propositions and Variables
 
 
 Autonomous institutional layer. This variable is mainly tied to lawmaking 
processes. When it comes to lawmaking, the US system of checks and balances and the 
UK parliamentary system operate differently. However, in both countries, a proposal 
must gain the approval of multiple government bodies in order to become law. In general, 
bodies that are independently elected and have veto power constitute autonomous 
institutional layers. Even if they are unelected and not directly involved in lawmaking 
processes, bodies that operate independently and have veto power are also autonomous 
institutional layers. This paper seeks to determine whether or not variations in the number 
of autonomous institutional layers had an impact on the fate of specific policy proposals 
in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 Labor movement fragmentation. This variable deals with the degree to which 
there is ideological unity across labor movements. Fragmented labor movements tend to 
take an insular, self-interested, firm-by-firm approach to issues, as opposed to a coalition-
building approach. This paper addresses the role that variations in labor movement 
fragmentation played in particular policy outcomes in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
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 Medical power. This variable is concerned with the extent to which medical 
organizations are able to pursue their own interests independent of the state. Medical 
power is a reflection of the nature of the relationships medical organizations have with 
other entities and/or an indication of the financial resources medical organizations have at 
their disposal. This paper examines the ways in which variations in medical power 
influenced specific policy outcomes in the United States and the United Kingdom. 
 Anti-statist sentiment. This variable focuses on the level of anti-statist sentiment 
that is present in cultural environments. Anti-statist cultural environments have the 
following characteristics: a focus on individual rights; an emphasis on equality of 
opportunity and respect, not of result or condition; and/or an aversion to centralized 
control. One of the avenues through which anti-statist sentiment reveals itself is the 
cultural framing of arguments. This paper analyzes the ways in which variations in 
cultural framing shaped particular policy outcomes in the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
 Universal health care. This variable refers to health care coverage that is based on 
residence rights not on the purchase of insurance. For the most part, funding for this 
health care coverage comes from general taxation. The primary aim of this paper is to 
explain variations in this variable as they relate to the United States and the United 
Kingdom. 
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Relationships Between Variables 
 The propositions (see the “Theory” section and/or the “Propositions and 
Variables” portion of the “Methods” section) indicate expected relationships between 
variables. What follows is a discussion of the implications of each proposition. 
 Political structures that have more autonomous institutional layers are less likely 
to implement universal health care. With more autonomous institutional layers with 
which to contend, American reformers likely faced obstacles that their British 
counterparts were able to avoid. In the United States, at every autonomous institutional 
layer, opponents probably took advantage of the potentially many opportunities they had 
to stop bold health care initiatives from advancing. In the United Kingdom, on the other 
hand, opponents likely had an extremely limited number of chances to derail policy 
proposals. 
 Labor movements that are more fragmented are less likely to achieve universal 
health care. With an insular, self-interested, firm-by-firm approach to issues, the US 
labor movement was probably not inclined to pursue universal health care. Alternatively, 
with the ability to unite at the national level, the UK labor movement likely had a 
legitimate opportunity to push for universal health care. 
 Medical organizations that have more power to pursue their own interests 
independent of the state are less likely to support universal health care. American 
medical organizations probably had the power to achieve their objectives without the 
state’s assistance. Therefore, they were likely not interested in lending their support to 
bold health care policy initiatives. In contrast, British medical organizations probably 
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needed the state’s help to reach their goals. As such, they were likely open to the idea of 
state intervention on health care. 
 Cultural environments that project more anti-statist sentiment are less likely to 
facilitate universal health care. In debates about health care, relevant parties in the 
United States probably relied more on anti-statist sentiment than did their counterparts in 
the United Kingdom. Through the use of anti-statist arguments, relevant parties in the 
United States were likely able to prevent health care measures from gaining the support 
necessary to secure passage. In distinction, relevant parties in the United Kingdom 
probably stayed away from anti-statist rhetoric, making the passage of legislation that 
called for a strong government role more likely to gain approval. 
 
Analysis 
 This paper uses the “most similar case comparison” analytic strategy. This 
strategy implies the selection of two very similar cases. These two cases should be alike 
in most ways but vary in the area of inquiry. In terms of this paper, the United States and 
the United Kingdom are similar when it comes to welfare state provision. However, these 
two countries have diverged on the issue of health care. The goal of this paper is to 
determine what accounts for this variation on health care. 
 
Weaknesses and Strengths of Research Design 
 This paper has three potential weaknesses. First, the focus here is on just two 
countries. Working with a small number of cases, it may be difficult to recognize 
competing explanations (e.g., demographics) for certain outcomes. With a larger sample, 
identifying all contributing factors to the origin/evolution of health care systems may be 
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easier to achieve. A contributing factor that is apparent in one case may not be so obvious 
in another. Second, given the small number of cases and the particular aspects of these 
cases, the results may not be generalizable. That said, some of the results may inform 
health policy in other countries, as well as other studies that deal with health care 
systems. Third, it may be difficult to create clear constructs that represent complex 
concepts. For example, accurately portraying what constitutes “labor movement 
fragmentation” is not an easy task to accomplish. 
 This paper also has three principal strengths. First, the use of Esping-Andersen’s 
“three worlds” typology makes it possible to state with confidence that the United States 
and the United Kingdom have much in common, except perhaps on the issue of health 
care. Second, the utilization of the new institutionalist paradigm, particularly sociological 
institutionalism, offers an opportunity to inform theory. Third, the historical-comparative 
approach allows for the option of incorporating data from several sources. 
 
Ethical Considerations 
 This paper does not incorporate primary data from human subjects. Consequently, 
the potential to harm individuals is nonexistent. However, this paper does offer an 
opportunity to inform ongoing debates about health care around the globe. 
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COUNTRY CASE STUDIES 
 
 
United States 
 The theoretical underpinnings of this paper indicate that political, labor, and 
medical institutions played a decisive role throughout the formative years of the US 
health care story. The cultural environment in which these various institutions operated 
was also important. What follows is an account of the events that took place during two 
major periods in US health policy history. These two time periods are of interest because 
they mark points where significant differences in the US and UK health care systems 
emerged. Relevant background information on political, labor, and medical institutions 
precedes this account. 
Background. Unlike many other countries, the United States has a federal and 
decentralized system of government (Blank and Burau 2004). The US Constitution 
specifies three branches of government: executive, legislative, and judicial. Voters 
separately elect the president (leader of the executive branch) and the Congress 
(legislative branch). The Congress is composed of a Senate and a House of 
Representatives (Raffel and Raffel 1997). A member of Congress must introduce any 
proposed law in the Senate or House. On introduction, members refer the bill to an 
appropriate committee for study. The committee prepares a report on the bill, which it 
forwards to the full Senate or House. As part of this process, the committee has hearings, 
which provide an opportunity for interested individuals and/or parties to express their 
support or opposition to the bill. Many bills never make it out of committee. Ultimately, 
for a bill to become law, both houses of Congress must pass it, and the president must 
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sign it. If the president refuses to sign the bill, it can still become law with the approval of 
two-thirds of both houses of Congress (Raffel and Raffel 1994). The United States also 
has an independent and active judiciary, which sometimes takes part in resolving 
important issues. Structurally, state political institutions are similar to federal political 
institutions. To complicate the situation further, federal and state governments often find 
themselves at odds with each other (Raffel and Raffel 1997). Since legislative proposals 
require approval at many autonomous institutional layers if they are to become law, the 
system of government in the United States favors incremental change. Bold reforms, 
including proposals calling for universal health care, are unlikely to survive the 
lawmaking process. Even if they successfully traverse the lawmaking process, proposals 
may still be subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
In terms of labor institutions, for much of the nineteenth century, American and 
British labor were similar in many respects. By the mid-1880s, however, the labor 
movements in the two countries were on different paths. American labor had become 
more radical than British labor. One late-nineteenth-century organization, the Knights of 
Labor, represented this shift in the US labor movement. The Knights of Labor was an 
inclusive and egalitarian organization. In contrast to other labor groups, the organization 
did not discriminate against workers of a particular skill level, nationality, race, or 
gender. Over a relatively short period of time, the organization’s membership grew 
considerably. By 1886, the Knights of Labor had organized about 10 percent of the 
industrial labor force. This dramatic growth was short-lived (Fantasia and Voss 2004). 
As the Knights of Labor expanded their influence and power, employers 
mobilized to stop them. As the government did little to constrain employers’ actions in 
22 
 
 
the United States of the 1880s, the Knights of Labor was unable to survive. The 
organization’s “social unionism” succumbed to its rival, a much more conservative 
“business unionism.” In other words, the defeat of the Knights of Labor was a victory for 
those who supported a moderate, pragmatic unionism. Samuel Gompers, president of the 
American Federation of Labor (AFL), was among the supporters of this viewpoint 
(Fantasia and Voss 2004). According to Fantasia and Voss (2004:37-8), “…the AFL’s 
version of unionism—narrow, craft-based, and sectional—became firmly 
institutionalized, making it that much more difficult for successive generations to imagine 
or to accomplish a broader industrial and general unionism that might venture to 
represent a wider social constituency.” Given these developments, the US labor 
movement was not inclined to pursue universal health care. 
With regard to medical institutions, the medical profession spent much of the 
nineteenth century struggling to become a voice of authority in matters related to health. 
Relying on their own common sense, many Americans simply refused to accept 
physicians as authoritative (Starr 1982). To combat this attitude of skepticism, some 
physicians “took…steps to reproduce in America the professional institutions that in 
England gave physicians a distinct and exclusive status” (Starr 1982:30). They 
established medical schools and medical societies. Through medical schools, these 
physicians hoped to elevate the medical profession. However, they were unable to stop 
other physicians from creating their own medical schools. The result was unrestricted 
competition among medical schools. Ultimately, to stay competitive, various medical 
schools shortened the length of terms, lowered their standards, and decreased fees (Starr 
1982). “In seeking to raise their status individually, physicians undermined it 
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collectively” (Starr 1982:44). In addition, some physicians, particularly those who 
admired British professional institutions, wanted state legislatures to extend licensing 
authority to medical societies. After some early failures, these physicians met some 
success; several state legislatures granted some licensure powers to medical societies. 
These powers turned out to be very limited and totally ineffective (Starr 1982). “Neither 
[medical schools nor medical societies] held definitive authority, since it was possible to 
enter medical practice without the approval of one or the other, or both” (Starr 1982:45). 
The medical profession, then, was in complete disarray (Starr 1982). 
Moreover, with concern that licensure was more about favoritism than 
competence abounding, many state legislatures rescinded licensing laws. Frustrated that 
the medical profession lacked a clear set of rules and regulations, several young 
physicians met to form a national medical association. This national group would soon 
become the AMA (Starr 1982). The AMA “aimed primarily to raise and standardize the 
requirements for medical degrees” (Starr 1982:90). It also established a code of 
professional ethics, which failed to acknowledge the legitimacy of certain kinds of 
physicians. For the first few decades of its existence, the AMA failed miserably in its 
endeavors, and divisions in the medical profession persisted. Toward the end of the 
nineteenth century, the AMA changed course. In an effort to unify and strengthen the 
medical profession, the AMA joined forces with its old adversaries. Working together, 
the AMA and its new allies were able to achieve the passage of several favorable 
licensing laws, an indication that the public was on its way to accepting the authority of 
the medical profession. In the early twentieth century, the AMA revised its constitution, 
creating a new representative body. Members of this new body would come mainly from 
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state medical societies. Eventually, under this new organizational structure, the AMA 
grew considerably (Starr 1982). As Starr (1982:110) notes, “From a mere eight thousand 
members in 1900, the AMA shot up to seventy thousand in 1910, half the physicians in 
the country…From this period dates the power of what came to be called ‘organized 
medicine.’” A large and authoritative organization, the AMA had the power to pursue its 
own interests independent of the state. 
 1900 to 1920. The ideal of universal access to health care surfaced at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. A growing recognition of the extent and impact of 
inadequate health care, especially among the working poor, was the primary reason for 
this development (Derickson 2005). According to Derickson (2005:1), “Progressive 
investigators disclosed a vicious cycle of poverty and sickness, a cycle too seldom broken 
by adequate and timely medical care.” Continuing in this vein, during and after World 
War I, several states established commissions to investigate health matters. However, the 
driving force behind the first major movement for health insurance in the United States 
was the American Association for Labor Legislation (AALL) (Terris 1999). In 1906, 
academic economists Richard Ely and Henry Farnam founded the AALL. Through labor 
legislation, the AALL aimed to protect American workers from the potential abuses of a 
capitalist system. AALL leaders believed that the state’s role in this process should be 
one of regulation not redistribution. Like many Progressives, AALL reformers thought 
that direct relief to individuals was a bad idea as it could lead to increased dependency. 
After a successful campaign for workmen’s compensation laws, the AALL turned its 
attention to the issue of health security (Hoffman 2001). 
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 In 1915, the AALL unveiled its “Standard Bill,” model legislation for compulsory 
health insurance. Though it had severe limitations, the plan represented a step toward 
universalism (Derickson 2005). AALL leaders settled on a state-by-state strategy for 
health insurance because they feared that “the courts would impose constitutional 
constraints on the implementation of national legislation” (Hoffman 2001:28). By 1916, 
reformers had introduced the Standard Bill in the legislatures of several states (Funigiello 
2005). 
Initially, many labor unions, as well as the AMA, reacted favorably toward the 
model legislation (Funigiello 2005). In the context of World War I, however, support for 
the plan evaporated quickly (Hoffman 2001). According to Hoffman (2001:46), “As 
wartime sentiment gave rise to a hatred of anything German, the AALL’s campaign also 
suffered because of compulsory health insurance’s origins in Germany.” Similarly, after 
the 1917 Russian Revolution, “anti-German sentiment increasingly became conflated 
with…Bolshevism and domestic radicalism” (Hoffman 2001:66). 
In an expression of this sentiment, the New York State Legislature dealt the 
Standard Bill a major blow in 1919. A Republican senator and a Democrat assemblyman 
introduced the New York version of the model legislation, the Davenport Bill. The State 
Senate passed the Bill. Yet, when the Bill reached the Assembly, Speaker Thaddeus 
Sweet, Chairman of the Rules Committee, would not allow a vote on it. Instead, the 
Speaker proceeded to denounce the Bill as “Bolshevistic.” In 1920, with the 
reintroduction of the Bill looming, the Speaker suddenly precipitated the removal of five 
Socialist assemblymen. Needless to say, the Bill died. Indeed, no state came as close as 
New York to enacting a version of the AALL plan (Terris 1999). Given the structure of 
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state political institutions, the failure of supporters to secure passage of the Standard Bill 
is hardly surprising. Essentially, at the height of its success, the model legislation was 
able to attain support at only one autonomous institutional layer in the legislature of a 
single state. 
 Aside from the opposition it faced within state political institutions, the Standard 
Bill encountered resistance inside the labor movement (Derickson 2005; Fox 1986; 
Gordon 2003; Hoffman 2001; Starr 1982). In particular, the AFL opposed the AALL’s 
efforts to enact compulsory health insurance laws. Moreover, many considered AFL 
president Samuel Gompers the spokesman for all of labor. Gompers had a strong distaste 
for state involvement in workers’ lives that stemmed from what he perceived to be a long 
history of government attacks (via the judiciary) on labor. Gompers felt that state-
administered, compulsory health insurance would undermine trade union power. He 
argued that strong unions were the best way to achieve health security for workers. 
Gompers also felt that compulsory health insurance was a threat to workers’ individual 
liberties as Americans (Hoffman 2001). According to Hoffman (2001:116), “The AFL 
leader’s fierce reaction to the [AALL] proposal sprang from his strongly held conception 
of the ‘independence’ of the American worker. Government interference in any aspect of 
workers’ lives was suspect, but in the case of medical care it represented a direct threat to 
the privacy of workers’ home lives and even of their bodies.” Gompers and his 
supporters, then, believed that state intrusion into health care would not only weaken 
unions, but create dependency (Hoffman 2001). 
 Despite the AFL leader’s opposition to compulsory health insurance, the Standard 
Bill did gain some support within the labor movement (Fox 1986; Hoffman 2001). 
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Supporters of the model legislation included several state labor federations (e.g., New 
York State Federation of Labor), women-dominated trade unions (e.g., Women’s Trade 
Union League), and industrial unions (e.g., United Mine Workers). Some supporters 
argued that a state-run health insurance system would benefit unorganized workers who 
did not have access to union benefits and/or the means to obtain private benefits. Other 
labor leaders believed that existing union benefits were inadequate, failing to provide for 
the needs of workers. Many supporters also liked the idea of compulsory wage 
deductions to pay for health insurance coverage, a central feature of the AALL proposal. 
Since workers would contribute to the plan’s cost, they would in no way be the 
beneficiaries of a charitable program. Ultimately, the AFL view of the state was 
victorious in the fight over compulsory health insurance (Hoffman 2001). Essentially, 
then, a high level of labor movement fragmentation undermined reformers’ efforts to 
secure passage of compulsory health insurance measures. 
 Medical institutions also challenged the Standard Bill. Specifically, the AMA 
initially supported the model legislation but later strongly opposed it (Fox 1986; 
Funigiello 2005; Gordon 2003; Starr 1982). In 1914, AALL reformers began drafting the 
Standard Bill. Having respect for professional authority, they sought to involve the 
medical profession in this process. Anticipating some physician resistance, AALL 
reformers were pleasantly surprised when they learned that prominent physicians were 
sympathetic to their cause and willing to help. Among these prominent physicians were 
some of the leaders of the AMA. Although the AALL and AMA were united in many 
respects, the two organizations came to disagree on the issue of physician remuneration 
(Starr 1982). 
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What is more, prior to 1920, local medical societies held most of the power in the 
AMA (Gordon 2003). “While [national] AMA leadership flirted with the idea of reform, 
state and local medical societies staked out what would become the profession’s stock 
positions, including a deep distrust of ‘contract’ practice and resistance to the intrusion of 
any third party in the patient-physician relationship” (Gordon 2003:212). Growing 
opposition from the medical profession made passage of the AALL proposal in state 
legislatures all that much more difficult. To compound the situation, with the entry of the 
United States into World War I, many physicians joined the service, and the AMA shut 
down its committee on social insurance. As a result of the war, anti-German sentiment 
increased. Opponents tied the Standard Bill to German social insurance, a program they 
argued was inconsistent with American values (Starr 1982). In short, having no restrictive 
ties to other entities, the AMA determined that it could best ensure professional 
autonomy without the state’s assistance. In fact, the organization considered the state a 
major threat more than a potential help. Therefore, the AMA ultimately opposed the 
model legislation. 
 In sum, state political institutions, as well as labor and medical institutions, played 
a significant role in the failure of AALL reformers to enact compulsory health insurance 
laws during the first part of the twentieth century. The cultural environment in which 
these institutions were embedded also had an impact. Though their goal was to gain 
passage of the Standard Bill in state legislatures all across the country, AALL reformers 
met success at only one autonomous institutional layer in a single state legislature (i.e., 
New York State Senate). In his effort to stop the legislation, Speaker Sweet of the New 
York State Assembly employed anti-Bolshevistic sentiment. Unable to agree on their 
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approach to health security, labor leaders ultimately succumbed to the AFL view of the 
state. In other words, a high level of labor movement fragmentation hindered reform 
efforts. In his charge against state-sponsored insurance, the AFL president relied on the 
rhetoric of individual rights. With no restrictive ties to other entities, the AMA concluded 
that it could best secure its interests in the absence of state intervention. Therefore, the 
AMA fought against the model legislation. In the framing of its arguments, the AMA 
contended that state intervention posed a threat to the patient-physician relationship. 
Institutions and culture, then, intertwined to derail compulsory health insurance 
measures. 
 1921 to 1950. After the failure of its compulsory health insurance campaign, the 
AALL directed its attention elsewhere. During the 1920s, the organization was mainly 
concerned with unemployment and old-age issues (Funigiello 2005). In other words, the 
movement for compulsory health insurance was dormant. Despite the movement’s 
inactivity, the 1920s saw an increase in concern about medical costs. Although medical 
costs had been rising for some time, it was not until the third decade of the twentieth 
century that the middle class felt the impact. Put another way, the economic problems 
associated with medical care started to affect a much larger portion of the population than 
they had in previous years (Starr 1982). 
 Growing concern over the costs of medical care led to the formation of the 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CCMC). Over a five-year period, the CCMC 
published more than twenty reports on medical care in the United States. In 1932, the 
CCMC released its final report (Starr 1982). The majority recommended group practice 
and prepaid insurance plans, but the Committee stopped short of calling for national 
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health insurance (Funigiello 2005). Alternatively, the majority supported a privately-
funded health insurance system, insisting that this type of system would be “more 
palatable to a nation that prided itself on individual freedom and private enterprise” 
(Funigiello 2005:11). Though not a single legislative proposal accompanied the CCMC 
final report (Gordon 2003), the group’s research provided a basis for New Deal proposals 
that were to come (Funigiello 2005). 
 At around the same time the CCMC released its final report, a dramatic shift was 
taking place in the role of American government. As a result of the Great Depression, 
many Americans looked to the government for relief (Weeks and Berman 1985). These 
circumstances offered an opportunity for renewed efforts to achieve health coverage for 
Americans. However, with millions of Americans out of work, unemployment insurance 
and old-age benefits were the top priorities (Starr 1982). In the 1932 election, Democrat 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), who had called for active federal involvement to aid 
struggling Americans during his campaign, won the presidency, and Democrats ended up 
with large majorities in both houses of Congress (Reeves 2000). With a new Democrat 
administration soon to be in power, social reform seemed possible (Starr 1982). Given 
the number of autonomous institutional layers in the US political system, though, social 
reform, especially related to health care, would be difficult to accomplish. 
 In 1933, FDR took office. During his first term, he set up various agencies for the 
purpose of combating the difficult economic conditions of the time. In mid-1934, FDR 
appointed the Committee on Economic Security (CES) to investigate problems related to 
economic security and make legislative recommendations. By the end of that same year, 
the Committee had a report ready for the President (Weeks and Berman 1985). In its 
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report, the CES deferred any recommendation on health insurance, pending the 
completion of additional research on the subject (Derickson 2005). From this report came 
the Social Security Bill (Weeks and Berman 1985). While Congress took up the Bill, the 
CES finished its research. Since its inclusion would likely have prevented the Bill from 
gaining the necessary political support for passage, health insurance was not part of the 
final legislative package (Derickson 2005). In 1935, the Social Security Bill became law 
(Funigiello 2005). Even though the Social Security Act did not contain health insurance, 
critics complained that the law would lead to a loss of traditional American self-reliance 
(Reeves 2000). 
 In the late 1930s, the push for health insurance gained a second wind. In 1936, 
FDR appointed an Interdepartmental Committee on Health and Welfare Activities 
(ICHWA). The aim of the ICHWA was to oversee activities within the government 
related to health care. Assuming widespread support for some form of national health 
insurance, the Committee sought to add this type of coverage to the Social Security Act 
(Gordon 2003). In 1937, the ICHWA established a Technical Committee on Medical 
Care (TCMC). The TCMC was to investigate what role the federal government should 
play in the nation’s health care. The ICHWA instructed the TCMC to draft 
recommendations for a national health program. In the process of constructing its report, 
the TCMC used data from the National Health Inventory (NHI), the most comprehensive 
research available on the nation’s health care. The NHI revealed the inadequacies of the 
health care practices and procedures of the time. Upon completion of the TCMC report, 
FDR called for a national conference on health care (Funigiello 2005). In mid-1938, the 
national health conference convened. Initially, FDR’s reaction to the conference was 
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enthusiastic. The President even thought that making national health insurance an issue in 
the 1938 election would be politically viable. It was not long, however, before he 
changed his mind. The 1938 election brought huge conservative gains. From this point 
forward, southern Democrats and Republicans formed an alliance, making health care 
reform extremely difficult. With the start of World War II, FDR turned his attention to 
foreign affairs. In 1939, Senator Robert Wagner of New York introduced a bill reflecting 
TCMC report recommendations (Starr 1982). He insisted that his bill would not infringe 
on states’ rights (Funigiello 2005). Unable to garner either presidential or congressional 
support, the Wagner Bill died in committee (Shaefer and Sammons 2009). In other 
words, Wagner’s proposal failed to gain support at even one autonomous institutional 
layer. 
 Despite this setback, Wagner and some of his colleagues continued to push for 
national health insurance. In 1943, Wagner, Senator James Murray of Montana, and 
Representative John Dingell of Michigan introduced a new bill to Congress (Starr 1982). 
This bill never made it out of committee (Shaefer and Sammons 2009). In 1944, as part 
of their effort to enact health legislation, representatives of several interest groups, 
including organized labor, met in Wagner’s office to form what eventually became the 
Committee for the Nation’s Health (CNH) (Starr 1982). This advocacy group coordinated 
lobbying activities in support of national health insurance. A year later, after FDR’s 
sudden death, Harry Truman became president. An advocate of national health insurance, 
Truman was anxious to get to work. A month later, Wagner, Murray, and Dingell 
introduced another bill. This bill, as well as several other Wagner-Murray-Dingell 
proposals over the next few years, never made it out of committee (Shaefer and Sammons 
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2009). Stated another way, all of these bills lacked the support necessary to gain passage 
at even one autonomous institutional layer. 
 Moreover, the committee hearings on the Wagner-Murray-Dingell bills reflected 
the post-World War II cultural debate taking place in the larger society. For example, in a 
1946 Education and Labor Committee meeting, Senator Murray began the proceedings 
with an exhortation to witnesses to refrain from using terms like “socialistic” or 
“communistic.” Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, the ranking minority member of the 
Committee, interrupted Murray immediately. Taft argued that the bill under consideration 
was the most socialistic measure that had ever come before Congress (Funigiello 2005). 
As Funigiello (2005:68) states, “Taft charged that the national health bill came straight 
out of the Soviet constitution.” Banging his gavel, Murray tried to stop Taft from 
speaking, but Taft continued. Murray refused to yield, which prompted Taft to leave the 
room. After announcing a boycott of the Committee’s meetings, Taft left little doubt that 
the Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill at issue would fail to advance. Though Murray said he 
would reintroduce the Bill later in the year, he was unable to do so as Republicans won 
majorities in both houses of Congress in the 1946 election (Funigiello 2005). 
This development crushed the prospects for health care reform (Shaefer and 
Sammons 2009). For the remainder of the decade, Republicans continued to assert that 
national health insurance was a step toward socialism. Despite these circumstances, 
Truman campaigned on national health insurance in the 1948 election (Starr 1982). 
Truman won the presidency, and Democrats regained control of Congress. Truman again 
attempted to pass legislation (Shaefer and Sammons 2009). Facing opposition from 
Republicans, as well as southern Democrats who were unhappy with his civil rights 
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initiatives, Truman again met failure, as the proposed legislation died in committee 
(Funigiello 2005). In other words, the legislation did not have enough support to ensure 
passage at even one autonomous institutional layer. 
Between 1921 and 1950, though unable to pass health insurance legislation, 
federal lawmakers did manage to enact several proposals that impacted the campaign for 
national health insurance. Much of this legislation dealt with labor issues (e.g., 1947 Taft-
Hartley Act) (Gordon 2003). The Supreme Court also played a role in the campaign for 
national health insurance in that it handed down rulings that affected labor (e.g., Inland 
Steel case) (Gordon 2003; Shaefer and Sammons 2009; Starr 1982). Political institutions, 
then, had an impact on the ways in which labor institutions shaped health policy during 
this time period. 
After the passage of the Social Security Act, the labor movement reentered the 
health policy arena. Much had changed since the fight over the AALL proposal in the 
1910s. Gompers, who had been an ardent opponent of the Standard Bill, was no longer 
AFL president. Moreover, the Great Depression had left millions of wage earners 
impoverished and union benefit plans devastated. As a result of these conditions, the AFL 
dropped its longstanding support of voluntarism (Derickson 2005). The same year the 
Social Security Act became law, another important piece of legislation made its way 
through Congress and reached the President’s desk (Starr 1982). The Wagner Act 
“limited the tactics employers could use in resisting unions, set up procedures for 
elections, and required management to bargain with unions that won the right to represent 
their workers” (Starr 1982:311). The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) had the 
responsibility of enforcing this legislation. The Wagner Act revitalized the labor 
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movement, prompting the formation of the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). 
Unions increased in size and influence (Reeves 2000). However, from 1935 to 1937, 
health benefits were not the primary concern for the labor movement. Rather, the newly 
established CIO was focused on the constitutionality of the Wagner Act. Indeed, the law 
was unclear as to whether or not health benefits were subject to collective bargaining. 
While both the AFL and CIO favored national health insurance, they also believed that 
collective bargaining had the potential to strengthen unions. Moreover, though they were 
unsure what the Wagner Act required of them, employers began to offer health plans to 
their employees, partly the result of union pressure and the possibility of federal 
legislation. The development of group health coverage, starting with Blue Cross, made 
this scenario feasible (Gordon 2003). 
The story of Blue Cross begins in Dallas, Texas. In 1929, around the beginning of 
the Great Depression, Baylor University Hospital agreed to provide over a thousand 
school teachers a few weeks of hospital care a year for $6 per person. Over time, the 
hospital entered into similar arrangements with several other groups. Other hospitals 
started comparable programs, which led to competition between hospitals for patients 
(Starr 1982). Both unions and employers found group health coverage an attractive 
option (Gordon 2003). 
With the proliferation of private insurance underway, Congress began the debate 
over the 1939 Wagner Bill. Although at odds in some respects, the AFL and CIO were 
unified in their support of the Bill (Funigiello 2005). These two organizations also 
supported the various national health insurance proposals of the 1940s (i.e., the Wagner-
Murray-Dingell bills) (Maioni 1997). Indeed, the AFL and CIO had a voice when it came 
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to the content of proposals during this time period (Weeks and Berman 1985). In fact, the 
1940s saw the formalization of the relationship between labor and the Democratic Party. 
This relationship was rooted in the New Deal legislation of the 1930s. By the end of the 
1940s, labor had devoted all of its political energies to the Democratic Party but had been 
unable to achieve national health insurance. The Democratic Party’s southern foundation 
was at least partly responsible for this outcome (Gordon 2003). 
Additionally, during and after World War II, a number of factors spurred the 
growth of private health insurance. A wartime wage freeze prompted employers to offer 
health benefits as a way to compete for workers. The 1942 Revenue Act allowed 
employers to deduct health insurance costs from their taxable earnings. Similarly, a 1943 
National War Labor Board ruling accorded favorable tax treatment to employers and 
workers participating in employer-based coverage schemes. The ruling also permitted 
labor to bargain for health benefits in lieu of wage increases. Because it greatly restricted 
union power, the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act further encouraged labor to pursue worker 
benefits, as opposed to a national health insurance program. This act, however, was 
unclear as to whether or not health benefits were subject to collective bargaining. A 1948 
NLRB ruling cleared up the matter, affirming that health benefits were indeed on the 
bargaining table. That same year, the Supreme Court upheld this NLRB ruling (Shaefer 
and Sammons 2009). Moreover, in order to diminish the appeal of union membership, 
many nonunion employers offered health benefits to their employees (Derickson 2005). 
Under these circumstances, private health insurance significantly expanded 
(Gordon 2003). As Gordon (2003:21) states, “In 1935 hospitalization, surgical, and 
medical insurance each covered about two million persons; by 1950 hospital insurance 
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reached fifty-five million, surgical insurance reached thirty-nine million, and medical 
insurance reached seventeen million.” This growth in private health insurance coverage 
greatly undermined reform efforts (Shaefer and Sammons 2009). With little hope of 
achieving reform, some unions even made the case for private health insurance options. 
A number of labor leaders argued that, in the absence of adequate government programs, 
unions had a responsibility to meet the need of workers’ security through collective 
bargaining (Gordon 2003). By the end of the 1940s, labor as a whole was far less active 
in its support of a national health insurance program (Shaefer and Sammons 2009). In 
brief, though it was originally behind reform efforts, the labor movement lacked the 
resources necessary to enact proposed legislation. After experiencing several setbacks, 
many unions turned to collective bargaining to meet the need of workers’ security. In 
other words, a high level of labor movement fragmentation ultimately resulted in the 
dramatic growth of the private insurance industry. 
Medical institutions, on the other hand, were largely successful in exerting their 
political will. Upon the release of the 1932 CCMC final report, the AMA attacked the 
majority position (Starr 1982). The AMA vehemently opposed the report’s two key 
recommendations: group practice and prepaid insurance plans. The AMA believed that 
the majority’s recommendations were the product of socialism and/or communism 
(Funigiello 2005). According to Funigiello (2005:11), “The AMA…responded to the 
majority’s recommendations by accusing the group of subverting American values and 
by reaffirming the sanctity of private practitioner fee-for-service medicine.” Partly the 
result of the AMA’s reaction to the majority position, upon taking office, FDR was 
hesitant to tackle the issue of health security (Starr 1982). Fearing that the AMA and its 
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congressional allies would kill the entire 1935 Social Security Act, the administration 
decided to exclude national health insurance from the legislative package (Funigiello 
2005). Similarly, the AMA strongly opposed the 1939 Wagner Bill. Though Wagner 
argued that his proposal was consistent in many respects with the AMA’s most recent 
position on health security, the AMA ultimately testified against the legislation (Starr 
1982). The AMA believed that the Wagner Bill would eventually lead to compulsory 
health insurance, which was code for “socialized medicine.” Continuing in this vein, the 
AMA opposed the national health insurance measures of the 1940s. The organization also 
had at its disposal the resources necessary to kill reform efforts (Funigiello 2005). 
For example, after Truman won the 1948 election, the AMA increased the amount 
of its membership fee. With the added funds, the AMA intensified its resistance to a 
national health insurance program. As part of its campaign, the AMA hired Whitaker and 
Baxter, a public relations firm. The AMA made $1.5 million available to the firm to 
spend against health reform efforts (Starr 1982). According to Starr (1982:285), 
“Whitaker and Baxter used pamphlets, the press, public speakers, and private contacts to 
stress that voluntarism was the American way and to persuade private organizations…to 
endorse the AMA position.” The efforts of the AMA in conjunction with Whitaker and 
Baxter were so successful that many supporters of health reform referred to national 
health insurance legislation as “socialized medicine” (Starr 1982). 
In contrast, the CNH, an advocacy group that represented organized labor and 
other proponents of a national health insurance program, had limited financial resources 
(Funigiello 2005). As Funigiello (2005:81) states, “Outspent, CNH was reduced to 
mailing each member of Congress a fact sheet—and hoped that it would be read!” In 
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short, having no restrictive ties to other entities, the AMA had many degrees of freedom 
to pursue its own objectives. Hence, the organization opposed state intervention in health 
care. Moreover, since it viewed state intervention as a threat to professional autonomy, 
the AMA used its financial resources to recruit allies. Having power superior to that of 
advocacy groups, the organization met some success as it strived to stop reform efforts. 
To summarize, from 1921 to 1950, political, labor, and medical institutions all 
played a significant role in the persistent defeat of health legislation. Moreover, anti-
statist rhetoric dominated the health care debate. At various autonomous institutional 
layers, politicians failed to give their support in numbers sufficient to secure passage of 
health insurance legislation. During lawmaking processes, opponents frequently 
characterized reform efforts as “socialistic” and/or “communistic.” Labor unions, though 
initially unified in their support of national health insurance, eventually turned to 
collective bargaining to serve the need of workers’ security. As they generally supported 
reform efforts, unions had little incentive to employ anti-statist rhetoric. With no 
restrictive ties to other entities, the AMA had the option of pursuing its objectives free 
from state intervention. As such, the organization rejected the notion of national health 
insurance. In the framing of its arguments, the AMA regularly made references to 
“socialized medicine.” Institutions and culture, then, worked together to stop national 
health insurance from becoming a reality. 
 
United Kingdom 
 Clearly, political, labor, and medical institutions played a decisive role throughout 
the formative years of the US health care story. The cultural environment in which these 
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institutions operated was also important. The same is true for the United Kingdom. Why, 
then, did the United States and the United Kingdom take such different paths on health 
care? Simply put, the political, labor, and medical institutions in the two countries had 
contrasting features. The United States and the United Kingdom also had distinct cultural 
environments in which these various institutions were embedded. What follows is an 
account of the events that transpired during two major periods of the UK health care 
story. This account comes after important background information on political, labor, and 
medical institutions. 
Background. In terms of political institutions, the United Kingdom has a unitary 
and centralized system of government (Blank and Burau 2004). In addition to being a 
parliamentary democracy, the United Kingdom is a constitutional monarchy with a royal 
head of state. The prime minister exercises executive authority. To aid in carrying out 
executive responsibilities, the prime minister appoints a cabinet from members of the 
legislature. The legislature, Parliament, is composed of the House of Lords (upper house) 
and the House of Commons (lower house). To become law, legislative proposals require 
the approval of both houses and royal assent (Hatcher 1997). As a result of legislation 
that gained passage in August 1911, however, the House of Lords lost veto power 
(Packer 1998). Currently, the upper house can only delay, not prevent, the passage of 
proposed laws. Moreover, in the context of lawmaking, royal assent is a constitutional 
formality. Voters elect one central government: Parliament. To remain in power, the 
prime minister must control a majority of the seats in the House of Commons. Therefore, 
the distinction between executive and legislative power is basically non-existent (Hatcher 
1997). Additionally, in the United Kingdom, a high court cannot challenge or override 
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Parliament (Blank and Burau 2004). Similarly, the central government does not share 
powers with sub-national governments (Hatcher 1997). Since legislative proposals 
require approval at only one autonomous institutional layer (i.e., the House of Commons) 
if they are to become law, the UK system of government is more inclined to produce any 
kind of change (non-incremental or incremental) than is the US system of government. 
Equally important is the fact that legislative proposals in the United Kingdom do not have 
to endure constitutional scrutiny in the same way they do in the United States. 
With regard to labor institutions, during the nineteenth century, to avoid the 
financial hardship that illness might bring, many workers created mutual aid groups 
called friendly societies. For a weekly contribution, these organizations provided sick 
pay, medical care, and a death benefit for their members. Friendly societies and 
physicians entered into agreements, which usually required physicians, in return for a 
fixed salary, to give medical care to society members (Goodman 1980). According to 
Jacobs (1993:44), “Through a vast network of local and national branches that stretched 
across Britain, Friendly Societies came to encompass 4.5 million of the most respected 
portion of the working class by the organization’s peak in the late 1800s.” As they grew 
larger, many friendly societies struggled financially. Despite this fact, these organizations 
held a great deal of political power (Goodman 1980). This being the case, they were more 
inclined to pursue legislation at the national level than their counterparts in the United 
States. 
As for medical institutions, in the United Kingdom, medicine’s pursuit of 
professional authority began during the sixteenth century. In 1518, a small, elite group of 
physicians were able to secure the charter for the Royal College of Physicians (Moran 
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1999). Throughout the next few centuries, other groups successfully established medical 
societies that were able to gain control over licensing procedures and/or educational 
standards (Levitt, Wall, and Appleby 1999). For example, the 1815 Apothecaries Act 
“gave the Society of Apothecaries the right to license those who had served a 5-year 
apprenticeship and passed examinations…” (Levitt et al. 1999:164). Despite the 
successes of medical societies, unqualified physicians thrived (Levitt et al. 1999). Hence, 
the “demand arose for a single licensing authority and a single professional qualification 
permitting practice in any branch of the profession” (Levitt et al. 1999:164). At the 
forefront of this drive for centralized control was the Provincial Medical and Surgical 
Association. This organization would soon change its name to the British Medical 
Association (BMA). The end result of the campaign was the passage of the 1858 Medical 
Act (Levitt et al. 1999). The Act firmly institutionalized what constituted a qualified 
physician (Moran 1999). 
Moreover, during the nineteenth century, many physicians both worked with 
friendly societies and operated their own private practices. With membership in working-
class organizations growing, an ever increasing number of physicians entered into 
agreements with friendly societies and/or other labor groups. Some physicians came to 
rely on society income for their subsistence. By the mid-1800s, many physicians had 
become dissatisfied with these arrangements. Hence, they made sporadic attempts to 
reform the system. Ultimately, they failed in these endeavors. Around the turn of the 
twentieth century, the BMA joined the struggle for reform. At the national level, the 
organization made every effort to rectify the situation. Unable to secure appreciable 
reform, the BMA eventually concluded that government intervention was a viable option 
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(Honigsbaum 1990). The BMA, then, did not have the power to pursue its own interests 
independent of the state. Of course, the circumstances under which the AMA operated 
were much different. 
 1900 to 1911. According to Sakala (1990:718), “War…provided an important 
impetus for the U.K. to move away from reliance on the Poor Law system, established in 
1601, and toward a national medical care program.” During the Boer War (1899-1902), 
many recruits were found unfit to serve (Sakala 1990). Public outrage led to the 1907 
School Medical Service Act, “the first major piece of public medical legislation 
providing personal medical services outside the jurisdiction of the Poor Law…” (Sakala 
1990:718). Also of significance were the majority and minority reports of the Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws and Relief of Distress. These two reports offered a 
critique of the poor-law system (Sakala 1990). It was not until 1911, however, that some 
form of national health insurance became law. David Lloyd George, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer under the Liberal government, was largely responsible for this outcome 
(Goodman 1980). 
In 1908, with the resignation of Prime Minister Henry Campbell-Bannerman, a 
cabinet reshuffle became unavoidable. When Herbert Asquith left his post of Chancellor 
to become the next prime minister, Lloyd George filled the vacancy. Continuing the work 
of his predecessor, Lloyd George took on the issue of old-age pensions (Packer 1998). 
After the passage of the 1908 Old Age Pensions Act, Lloyd George turned his attention to 
the issues of unemployment and invalidity. To study these issues, Lloyd George visited 
Germany, a country with a national insurance scheme already in place (Grigg 1978). 
According to Grigg (1978:314), “He returned favouring, for these problems, the method 
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of contributory insurance which had not been applied in the old age pensions scheme.” 
Concerned with sickness as a cause of poverty, Lloyd George eventually proposed a plan 
that would provide medical care for some workers. To make his plan viable, he had to 
build support. Through skillful negotiation and compromise, Lloyd George was able to 
accomplish this goal (Goodman 1980). 
To aid in the process of making national insurance a reality, Lloyd George 
brought together a group of colleagues to discuss the matter. One point of debate was 
whether or not British national insurance should operate on the dividing-out principle or 
the accumulation principle. While Lloyd George preferred the former, one of his 
colleagues, William Braithwaite, supported the latter. Since he needed the cooperation of 
those who espoused the accumulation principle, Lloyd George eventually succumbed to 
Braithwaite’s point of view (Grigg 1978). As Grigg (1978:324) states, “To the Tories, 
and indeed to many Liberals, the dividing-out principle was suspect, whereas 
accumulation seemed responsible and sound. Since…[Lloyd George’s] aim was to win 
conservative endorsement of a radical measure, he felt obliged to accept a method of 
insurance which his private judgment rejected....” In addition to this concession, Lloyd 
George made a special effort to be friendly toward his opponents. In time, his proposal 
was ready for submission to the cabinet. Shortly thereafter, the cabinet gave the proposal 
its approval. A month later, Lloyd George introduced his scheme in the House of 
Commons. After a series of debates and the adoption of several amendments, Parliament 
passed the measure. Although it varied in significant ways from Lloyd George’s original 
plan, the National Insurance Act became law in December 1911 (Grigg 1978). In short, 
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with only one autonomous institutional layer with which to contend, a shrewd politician 
was able to make national health insurance a reality in the United Kingdom. 
In addition to political institutions, labor institutions were instrumental in shaping 
health policy during the 1910s. To achieve passage of the 1911 National Insurance Act, 
Lloyd George sought the support of working-class organizations, particularly friendly 
societies (Goodman 1980). According to Gilbert (1965:128), “The societies had…a 
reputation for great parliamentary influence. No government could ignore them, a Liberal 
administration threatened by a growing Labour party least of all.” Although they had 
political clout, many friendly societies were in serious financial trouble (Grigg 1978). As 
Grigg (1978:317) states, “More and more of their members were living on into old age, 
while the declining birth-rate was a blow to recruitment. There were too many societies 
chasing too few potential members and finding their actual members an increasing 
burden.” Despite these circumstances, friendly societies’ general reaction to Lloyd 
George’s proposal was one of suspicion (Grigg 1978). Concerned that the government 
might become too involved in their activities, many friendly societies were hesitant to 
give Lloyd George’s plan their support. However, Lloyd George was able to convince 
these friendly societies that he intended to work through them, not eliminate them 
(Goodman 1980). He assured them that his plan would “make State insurance 
compulsory for all working men who could not be better provided for by friendly 
societies, but in no way to compete with the societies” (Grigg 1978:317). The scheme, 
then, would target a specific segment of the population, as well as provide a sickness, 
disability, and widowhood benefit. Friendly societies would offer different benefits, 
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including a payment on death. Lloyd George also agreed to allow friendly societies, in 
the form of “approved societies,” to administer the plan (Gilbert 1965). 
To complicate matters for both Lloyd George and friendly societies, a group 
known as the “Combine” entered the debate. The group was composed of several 
industrial insurance companies and collecting societies (Gilbert 1965). The Prudential 
was perhaps the most important of these companies (Grigg 1978). According to Gilbert 
(1965:129), “The Prudential was the nation’s largest holder of railroad securities, the 
largest private owner of ground rents and freehold properties, the largest holder of Bank 
of England stocks, the greatest source of the local authority borrowing, and nearly the 
largest owner of colonial and Indian government bonds.” The Prudential and its allies, 
then, formed a powerful industrial insurance lobby. The chief representative of the 
Combine was Howard Kingsley Wood. In general, industrial insurance policies provided 
only a funeral benefit. The Combine feared that the inclusion of a widowhood benefit in 
Lloyd George’s plan would be detrimental to business (Grigg 1978). As a widowhood 
benefit would be due to the widow upon the death of the breadwinner, the Combine 
believed that this type of benefit would be indistinguishable from a funeral benefit. Under 
tremendous pressure from the Combine, Lloyd George dropped the widowhood benefit 
from the scheme (Gilbert 1965). 
Eventually, at the prompting of Kingsley Wood, the Combine asked to join the 
scheme. The group sought the same approved status that Lloyd George had granted to 
friendly societies (Grigg 1978). “In case the Government in the future decided to offer 
some form of death benefits, the companies felt they would be better able to protect their 
existing business as administrators on the inside of the health program” (Gilbert 
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1965:139). Many friendly societies strongly objected to this idea. Later, the Combine 
intensified its efforts to gain approved status. The group worried that friendly societies 
would use the government program to monopolize the funeral benefit industry. Unhappy 
with friendly societies, the BMA threw its political weight behind the companies and 
collecting societies. To the dismay of many friendly societies, the Combine obtained 
approved status (Gilbert 1965). 
As Braithwaite and others believed that the scheme would be impossible to work 
without the support of friendly societies, Lloyd George found himself in a situation where 
his rhetorical skills might be of some use (Gilbert 1965). At some point during the 
conflict between the Combine and friendly societies, he also offered friendly societies 
what amounted to a massive subsidy to society reserves. Since they were financially 
struggling, many friendly societies could not turn away from an opportunity to greatly 
increase their funds (Grigg 1978). As Grigg (1978:325) states, “Lloyd George thus 
gained the qualified support of the ‘Combine’ without losing that of the friendly societies, 
and without altering his scheme out of recognition.” In short, though the Combine 
complicated matters, friendly societies on the whole remained committed to the passage 
of Lloyd George’s national health insurance proposal. 
Lloyd George also sought the support of medical institutions. The BMA opposed 
Lloyd George’s original plan. The organization was concerned that the plan would give 
too much control to friendly societies. For a long time, physicians had been unhappy with 
the extent to which friendly societies exercised power over the provision of medical care. 
To mollify physicians, Lloyd George gave control of medical benefits to the public sector 
(Starr 1982). As Starr (1982:256) notes, “Thus the shift of medical care into the public 
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sector in Britain arose partly because of the doctors’ desire to liberate themselves from a 
form of client control.” In other words, physicians were willing to accept government 
intervention if it meant getting out from under the thumb of friendly societies (Starr 
1982). The medical profession also opposed Lloyd George’s original plan because of the 
issue of remuneration. Physicians worked for incomes that were already relatively 
modest, and they feared that the plan would make matters worse. With the threat of a 
physician boycott looming, Lloyd George increased the minimum capitation fee 
physicians would receive under the plan (Goodman 1980). Despite these concessions, the 
BMA called a strike against the government. However, BMA opposition diminished as 
physicians realized they could make more money if they worked under Lloyd George’s 
scheme (Starr 1982). In short, the BMA lacked the power to pursue its own interests 
independent of the state. Bound by restrictive ties to other entities, the organization was 
open to government involvement in health care. 
Similar to the situation in the United States, political, labor, and medical 
institutions all played a vital role in shaping UK health policy during the first part of the 
twentieth century. The cultural environment in which these institutions operated was also 
important. However, contrasting institutional and cultural realities produced divergent 
outcomes in the two countries. Success at only one autonomous institutional layer spelled 
defeat for reformers in the United States, whereas a similar feat resulted in the 
implementation of a national health insurance program in the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, noticeably absent from the health policy discussion in the United Kingdom 
was the anti-statist rhetoric characteristic of the debate in the United States. While the 
AFL view of the state prevailed over alternative perspectives in the United States, a sense 
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of unity in support of a national health insurance program was prevalent among friendly 
societies in the United Kingdom. Some friendly societies expressed concern over the 
potential for state involvement in health care, but the AFL and its allies were explicitly 
anti-statist in their approach. With no restrictive ties to other entities, the AMA 
determined that it could best secure its interests in the absence of state intervention. In 
contrast, with limited power to independently pursue its own interests, the BMA 
concluded that state intervention was a viable option. Additionally, unlike its counterpart 
in the United Kingdom, the AMA exuded an anti-statist attitude. Variations in 
institutional and cultural realities, then, contributed to distinct policy outcomes in the two 
countries. 
 1912 to 1950. The next major debate over health policy in the United Kingdom 
culminated in the passage of the 1946 National Health Service Act. Though it represented 
a significant step toward more government involvement in the provision of medical care, 
the 1911 National Insurance Act had limitations. The Act covered some workers but not 
their families. Moreover, the Act was concerned only with the provision of general 
practitioner (GP) services not hospital care (Ham 1999). As such, the indigent largely 
continued to rely on the poor-law system for relief, and much of the working class gained 
access to hospital care through private insurance (Goodman 1980). 
Over time, many Britons became dissatisfied with these arrangements. Working 
under the Lloyd George scheme, some physicians complained that their incomes were not 
increasing at the same pace as consumer prices. They also objected to the fact that the 
plan offered little incentive for them to maintain a high quality of care. However, since 
treatment was “free” at the time of service, patients had incentive to demand much from 
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physicians. To complicate the situation further, many Britons were frustrated that 
inequalities persisted under the plan. Some approved societies provided better services 
than others. Likewise, a common belief was that private insurance was superior to public 
insurance (Goodman 1980). 
Moreover, as Sakala (1990:718) states, “The British experience with military 
medicine in the First World War helped create a consensus among doctors that medicine 
should be rationally organized.” Together with the 1918 influenza pandemic, this 
consensus led to the formation of the Ministry of Health (Sakala 1990). As Hardy 
(2001:77) states, “The establishment of the new Ministry of Health…promised 
integrated, health-oriented policies at national level.” To accomplish these goals, the 
Ministry appointed the Consultative Council on Medical and Allied Services to provide 
some direction on health policy. The group’s chair was Lord Bertrand Dawson (Sakala 
1990). Ultimately, the Dawson Report endorsed the idea of a “comprehensive scheme of 
hospital and primary health care” (Ham 1999:10). Later reports also offered suggestions 
for change. The Royal Commission on National Health Insurance issued a report in 1926, 
and the BMA released a report in 1930 and 1938 (Ham 1999). Indeed, strong sentiment 
in favor of change was abounding. 
 Operating within a unitary and centralized system of government, legislators 
passed the 1929 Local Government Act. The Act gave local authorities the power to 
convert old poor-law institutions into municipal hospitals (Honigsbaum 1990). During 
the 1930s, however, major health care reform was not the primary concern in government 
deliberations. Rather, the economy and foreign policy were the dominant issues of the 
decade. This being the case, Ministry of Health officials pursued only a couple of 
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incremental reforms. Eventually, they concluded that it was impractical to attempt even 
minor changes. Though they agreed that the status quo was unacceptable, Ministry of 
Health officials recognized that they would likely encounter fierce opposition from 
various interest groups. They also believed that the general political climate presented 
practical difficulties they would probably not be able to overcome (Jacobs 1993). The 
Conservative Party had become associated with “economic recovery and prudence,” 
while the Labour Party had lost credibility due to its past failures (Jacobs 1993:65). 
 Prior to World War I, the early Labour Party had put its political weight behind 
the Liberal Party (Skocpol 1992). However, the war created new opportunities for the 
Labour Party to expand its power. Trade unions’ influence increased within a national 
wartime labor market, and the Liberal Party split (Morgan 1984). “All this enabled 
Labour to emerge unambiguously after the war as the decisive voice of the British left” 
(Morgan 1984:10). The franchise reform of 1918 reinforced this new role for the Labour 
Party. Enfranchising millions of working-class voters, this reform created a democratic 
impetus for a class-based political party (Morgan 1984). After a few short years, though, 
the Labour Party was in disarray (Jacobs 1993). As Jacobs (1993:70) states, “During the 
interwar period, the Liberal party continued its slide into obscurity, and the governments 
formed by Labour in 1924 and 1929-31 were political disasters, discrediting that Party 
and throwing the entire organized labor movement into retreat.” Political and labor 
institutions, then, were inextricably tied to each other. 
 This trend continued into the 1940s. At the onset of World War II, the 
Conservative Party controlled the government. However, it soon entered into an 
agreement with its opposition, especially the Labour Party. Conservatives brought Labour 
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into the government as an equal partner. In return, Labour agreed to support 
Conservatives’ conduct of the war. Labour became a powerful force in domestic affairs. 
Wartime experiences encouraged support for expanded government involvement in 
health matters. In response to this sentiment, Labour wanted to make a commitment to 
postwar social reform. Conservatives, on the other hand, objected to this idea. The two 
parties were able to compromise: the government would simply study the issue of 
postwar reform (Jacobs 1993). “Although the Conservatives viewed this process as a 
means for limiting policy discussion and restraining public expectations, it ultimately 
encouraged policymakers and the public to expect major postwar reforms” (Jacobs 
1993:72). This movement toward policy investigation led to the formation of several 
committees, including William Beveridge’s committee (Jacobs 1993). 
 In 1942, Beveridge’s committee published its report. In short, the Beveridge 
Report called for a compulsory social insurance program, with comprehensive, “cradle to 
grave” coverage (Morgan 1984). More specifically, the Report made three major 
recommendations: a new health service, a children’s allowance program, and a full 
employment plan. In addition, Beveridge’s proposal contended that benefits should be 
universally available (Jacobs 1993). The Report was enormously popular and “became 
the foundation of all detailed social planning and policy-making for the post-war world” 
(Morgan 1984:21). Though they had points of disagreement, partners in the coalition 
government came to accept Beveridge’s proposal (Jacobs 1993). Then, in 1944, the 
coalition issued a White Paper that recommended a compulsory health insurance 
program. Under the plan, coverage would extend to the entire population (Goodman 
1980). The following year, Labour was victorious in the general election (Morgan 1984). 
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These developments set the stage for the passage of the 1946 National Health Service 
Act. 
 No longer a partner in a coalition government, Labour departed from previous 
discussions and arrangements on health policy in two major ways. First, Labour 
formulated bold new ideas (e.g., nationalization of hospitals). Second, Labour introduced 
proposals to Parliament, which the coalition government had failed to do. To ensure 
significant control over the health reform process, Prime Minister Clement Attlee 
reorganized the cabinet. As a result of this restructuring, Attlee and the cabinet greatly 
influenced the development of legislation. Minister of Health Aneurin Bevan produced a 
proposal. Shortly thereafter, the cabinet began considering Bevan’s plan. Various 
ministers disagreed on specific features of the plan, especially the issue of nationalizing 
hospitals. They asked Bevan to provide more detailed information (Jacobs 1993). 
Eventually, though points of contention remained, the cabinet accepted the core 
components of Bevan’s proposal and authorized the drafting of a bill. Labor 
representatives in the House of Commons strongly supported these actions. Ultimately, 
the cabinet introduced the bill to Parliament (Jacobs 1993). As Jacobs (1993:174) states, 
“With the important battles fought within the government’s revamped policy making 
structure, the cabinet’s bill was overwhelmingly carried in Parliament with no significant 
alterations; it was signed into law in November 1946.” In addition to reorganizing its 
internal policymaking process, the Labour government was able to achieve this feat 
because it had restricted interest group participation in the formulation of legislation. The 
cabinet had endorsed Bevan’s position that, in a democratic system, elected officials 
should make decisions about the main features of proposals (Jacobs 1993). In brief, with 
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only one autonomous institutional layer with which to contend, reformers were able to 
gain enough support to ensure legislative success. Moreover, the Labour Party was 
unified and persistent in its efforts to achieve health care reform. Political and labor 
institutions, then, were instrumental in the passage of the 1946 National Health Service 
Act. 
Medical institutions were also important. A result of the 1911 National Insurance 
Act, the medical profession was tied to the state. The expansion and coordination of state-
sponsored health activity was, therefore, an appealing option (Sakala 1990). In its 1942 
report, the BMA recommended “nothing less than a centrally planned public medical 
service under government control” (Goodman 1980:13). Despite this fact, the 
organization was worried when the Labour Party won the 1945 election. Most physicians 
were not opposed to national involvement in health matters. They were, however, 
concerned about excessive government control (Goodman 1980). 
To gain the support of the medical profession, Bevan made many concessions to 
both consultants (specialists) and GPs. For example, he agreed to allow consultants to 
maintain their private practices. Under the new system, consultants would be able to treat 
private patients in government hospitals (Morgan 1984). Bevan also agreed to permit GPs 
to practice as “independent contractors.” In other words, they would not be salaried 
employees of the state (Goodman 1980). (The BMA doubted Bevan’s sincerity on this 
point.) Though Bevan granted these concessions, the BMA still objected to the plan. In a 
1946 BMA ballot, GPs voted against participation in the new health service by a huge 
margin. A 1948 BMA ballot had a similar result. Without the support of the nation’s 
physicians, Bevan was concerned that the service would be shackled from the start. A 
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few months before the launch of the service, Bevan delivered a precise statement 
addressing physicians’ concerns (Morgan 1984). He “affirmed that no whole-time 
salaried service would be introduced by regulation” (Morgan 1984:160). With support for 
the service growing among GPs, the BMA reluctantly recommended that its members 
drop their opposition (Goodman 1980). In short, as it was already tied to the state, the 
organization ultimately determined that opposition to the scheme was contrary to its own 
interests. 
As was the case in the United States from 1921 to 1950, political, labor, and 
medical institutions were all instrumental in determining UK health policy from 1912 to 
1950. Also crucial was the cultural environment in which these institutions were 
embedded. Yet, the two countries ended up with different results, as distinct institutional 
and cultural realities produced contrasting outcomes. Success at one autonomous 
institutional layer in the United Kingdom resulted in the passage of a universal health 
care program. A similar achievement in the United States would not have been adequate. 
Moreover, unlike their counterparts in the United Kingdom, opponents in the United 
States often engaged in anti-statist rhetoric during the lawmaking process. Though 
initially unified in their support of a national health insurance program, US labor unions 
eventually turned to collective bargaining to serve the need of workers’ security. In 
contrast, the Labour Party in the United Kingdom was unified and committed to the 
passage of a national health insurance program. As supporters of a national health 
insurance program, neither the US labor unions nor the UK labor party had much use for 
anti-statist language. With no restrictive ties to other entities, the AMA was in a position 
to achieve its own ends without the state’s help. Alternatively, the BMA was closely tied 
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to the state and was somewhat limited in its options because of this relationship. 
Additionally, unlike its counterpart in the United Kingdom, the AMA frequently used 
anti-statist rhetoric in the framing of its arguments. Variations in institutional and cultural 
realities, then, contributed to contrasting policy outcomes in the two countries. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The primary question at issue in this paper is the following: given the similarities 
between the two countries with regard to welfare state institutions, why have the United 
States and the United Kingdom diverged on the issue of health care? Drawing on the new 
institutionalist paradigm, and particularly on sociological institutionalism, this paper 
provides an answer to this question: during the formative years of the health care stories 
in the two countries, variations in institutional and cultural conditions produced 
contrasting policy outcomes. More specifically, this paper shows the ways in which 
political, labor, and medical institutions impacted the fate of certain policy proposals in 
the United States and the United Kingdom. What is more, this paper demonstrates the 
role that culture played in these processes. In short, the data provide support for this 
paper’s four propositions. 
 These results make evident the value of an approach that utilizes the principles of 
sociological institutionalism. A meso-level perspective, sociological institutionalism 
contrasts sharply with other viewpoints. For example, drawing on the macro-level 
theorist Karl Marx, some scholars opt for a class-based approach. These scholars examine 
the ways in which class-based political struggles shape the welfare state (e.g., Korpi 
1978). The results here demonstrate the inadequacy of a perspective that concentrates 
solely on working-class strength. For instance, the data show that medical institutions 
were central to policy outcomes. Other scholars take a meso-level approach that deals 
with institutions; however, these scholars focus mainly on political institutions, or in 
other words, the state (e.g., Orloff and Skocpol 1984). Again, the results here 
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demonstrate the limits of such a perspective in that both state and non-state institutions 
were instrumental to policy outcomes. 
 Of course, this paper’s results have implications for current policy debates. With 
an increased understanding of the role that institutions and culture play in policy 
outcomes, important stakeholders may be in an improved position to assess the range of 
legislative possibilities. Similarly, they may be better able to discern the extent to which 
existing institutional arrangements can effectively accommodate potential changes. These 
points apply to both health policy, as well as to other types of policy. For example, 
scholars may find it worthwhile to apply sociological institutionalism to tax policy or 
energy policy. Naturally, in such studies, the relevant institutions may differ from the 
ones this paper highlights. Surely, then, sociological institutionalism is a significant asset 
to scholars working in a variety of fields. An exploration of the ways in which the other 
branches of the new institutionalist paradigm (i.e., historical institutionalism and rational 
choice institutionalism) or other institutional theories are applicable to an array of 
subjects may also be insightful. 
Certainly, this paper makes a valuable contribution to several areas of scholarship, 
including the following: health studies, institutional theory, policy studies, and 
comparative welfare state studies. That said, this paper has limitations. For instance, 
while it addresses the issue of culture, this paper does not really explain to any great 
extent the sources of cultural differences between the United States and the United 
Kingdom. A thorough examination of the roots of these cultural differences may be 
useful, especially since anti-statist sentiment is still a major component of the cultural 
framing of arguments in the United States (AP 2009; Neuman 2009). Similarly, 
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Americans still have a strong aversion to “socialism” (Newport 2010). Undoubtedly, 
then, scholars have no shortage of inquiries to pursue. 
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